Ghana’s cocoa sector has come under renewed scrutiny as emerging analysis suggests that the debt position of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) played a significant role in the country’s broader fiscal challenges, which culminated in the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP).
Between 2017 and 2024, under President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s public debt rose sharply amid increasing fiscal deficits, external shocks, and heavy borrowing. During this period, Joseph Boahen Aidoo, Chief Executive of COCOBOD, oversaw a system that relied heavily on borrowing through cocoa bills, syndicated loans, and cocoa bonds to finance operations.
By 2022, the country had lost access to international capital markets, inflation had surged, and the cedi had depreciated significantly, forcing government intervention. In December that year, Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta introduced the DDEP as part of an IMF-backed restructuring plan to address mounting debt pressures.
While the programme targeted over GH¢80 billion in domestic debt, analysts indicate that quasi-public liabilities—including those of COCOBOD—formed a substantial part of the overall burden.
Current figures show COCOBOD’s total debt obligations standing at approximately GH¢16.18 billion. This includes GH¢7.72 billion in cocoa bond principal and GH¢3.46 billion in coupon commitments, with about GH¢6.48 billion due in the near term. Repayment obligations are heavily concentrated between 2025 and 2028.
Observers note that COCOBOD’s borrowing, initially intended to support seasonal cocoa purchases, gradually expanded into long-term commitments tied to infrastructure, procurement, and operational costs. This shift, they argue, transformed what was once manageable financing into structural debt.
The impact of these liabilities extended beyond the cocoa sector. Financial institutions exposed to government securities and cocoa-related instruments were forced to tighten lending following the DDEP, while individual investors faced delays in expected returns due to restructured bond terms.
At the same time, concerns have been raised about procurement practices within the cocoa sector. Between 2019 and 2025, COCOBOD reportedly contracted over 286,000 bales of jute sacks valued at more than US$253 million. However, less than a third of these had been delivered by April 2025, even as cocoa production declined significantly from over one million tonnes to about 480,000 tonnes.
This mismatch between procurement commitments and output has been cited as evidence of inefficiencies within the system, with potential implications for farmers and supply chains.
Further compounding the situation are cocoa road projects, where commitments reached GH¢26.5 billion but only about GH¢5.4 billion has reportedly been paid, leaving a substantial funding gap.
Despite the DDEP, analysts stress that the debt burden has not been eliminated but rather restructured, with repayment timelines extended. COCOBOD alone faces over GH¢4.6 billion in bond repayments scheduled for 2026, split across March and August.
The situation has reignited debate over fiscal discipline and accountability within state institutions. Some experts argue that better management of COCOBOD’s financial commitments during the period in question could have reduced the scale and severity of Ghana’s debt restructuring programme.
The developments underscore the interconnected nature of sectoral and national finances, highlighting how challenges within a single state institution can have far-reaching consequences for the broader economy.
By Philip Kendriz Elikem
